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Abstract: This paper is supposed to analyze briefly one of key elements of the Chinese strategy 
aimed on weakening the American military dominance, with the special attention to the role of 
space systems therein. It describes in the most general terms the military strategy of the United 
Statest, then it pictures the Chinese A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) concept as an asymmetric 
answer to the U.S. military supremacy. The special attention is paid to its limitations and the role 
of space systems in overcoming the restraints. And finally it characterizes some of the political 
consequences that come out of all the above and that might reflect on the general state of the 
space security.
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Streszczenie: Niniejszy artykuł ma za zadanie pokrótce scharakteryzować jeden z podstawo-
wych elementów chińskiej strategii ograniczania militarnej dominacji USA, ze szczególnym 
uwzględnieniem roli systemów kosmicznych. W najbardziej ogólnych kategoriach omawia 
więc amerykańską strategię militarną; a następnie opisuje chińską koncepcję A2/AD jako asy-
metryczną odpowiedź na amerykańską przewagę. Szczególną uwagę zwracamy na ogranicze-
nia tej koncepcji i rolę systemów kosmicznych w ich przezwyciężaniu. I wreszcie omawiamy 
niektóre polityczne konsekwencje powyższego, które mogą oddziaływać na stan bezpieczeń-
stwa kosmicznego.
Słowa kluczowe: Stosunki międzynarodowe, bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe, bezpieczeń-
stwo kosmiczne, broń kosmiczna, A2/AD, Chiny, USA.
The People’s Republic of China expanded its space-borne capabilities noticeably wi-
thin the last few decades by launching a great number of satellites into orbits. This way 
the capacity of the state and the commercial sector to benefit from the characteristics of 
the outer space increased significantly – the international prestige gained is also of a gre-
at value. And so, we can observe a relatively fast increase in size and potential of the Chi-
nese satellite constellations, more and more ambitious scientific missions and an evolu-
tion of the ability to impact other countries’ satellite systems. All those developments are 
related mostly to the national security and especially to its military dimension.
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The basic reference point of the whole Chinese space program is the United States. 
It is obvious, because China’s ambitions to emerge as a power with the ability to take 
part in shaping of the international order are more and more geographically widespread 
(Lind, p. 74) and increasingly backed by the military means (Rahmat, Willett). By doing 
this the PRC faces the American worldwide military domination, that is supportive of 
the global reach of the Washington’s multi-faceted interests. And as China asserts that 
it does not accept the United States as the sole actor that dictates the rules of conduct in 
the world to its own selfish interests, Beijing is poised to confront the military might of 
the U.S. first place. That is why China prepares multilayered and long time-frame acti-
vities bound to diminish a military preponderance of the United States, through „[…] 
producing capabilities that have the potential to reduce core U.S. military technological 
advantages […]” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. II). This is supposed, in turn, to 
amplify a pace of erosion of the American political and economic influence. What is 
especially important from a point of view of this article is that capabilities, strategies 
and military infrastructure developed for that task increasingly rely on the use of orbital 
systems. Simultaneously, China consequently develops counter-satellite systems to thre-
aten the American space based assets that are indispensable force multipliers. This way 
the outer space has became an important arena of the U.S.-Chinese competition, and in 
the future it may likely turn into a field of confrontation. But, conversely, it might also 
become a common ground for cooperation in the security realm.
This paper is supposed to analyze briefly one of key elements of the Chinese strategy 
aimed on weakening the American military dominance, with the special attention to the 
role of space systems therein. This, in turn, will lead to the evaluation of some intere-
sting political consequences from a wider perspective of the space security. But to reach 
this conclusion it is necessary to develop the picture of broader background comprising 
of important issues pertaining “terran” politico-military relations. Thus, firstly, we will 
describe in the most general terms the military strategy of the United States, understood 
as the instrument of support for the process of achieving the main goals of the state in 
the international realm. Secondly, we will picture the Chinese A2/AD (anti-access/area 
denial) concept that is an asymmetric answer to the U.S. military supremacy, with the 
special attention to its limitations and the role of space systems in overcoming the re-
straints. And finally, we will characterize some of the political consequences that come 
out of all the above and that might reflect on the general state of the space security.
It is worth to note, that while all those issues are supposed to be analyzed from 
a point of view of the international relations they are also deeply rooted in the modern 
military technology and are of course subject to the general laws of physics. It seems 
quite obvious, but it is not always recognized well enough, that consequences for the 
strategies or for the policies that stem out of the technologies’ features and limitations 
are profound and overwhelming. It is therefore rather impossible to grasp the political 
processes that we are going to depict here, without understanding the underlying tech-
nologies. Thus it is necessary to at least mention some details but we will try to not to 
blur the argument with too many technicalities. For more detailed technical data and 
the analyses based on it see a meticulous and highly informative paper by noted analysts 
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Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich: „Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese An-
tiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia”, 
published in the journal International Security in 2016 (Biddle, Oelrich).
The A2/AD Concept as the Answer to the Military Might  
of the United States
The term mentioned in the title above refers to the kind of military strategy that 
may be implemented in the peacetime, during the crises of various characters and in 
the all out war. This strategy may have various features in different circumstances, may 
also be a part of broader military campaigns or political strategies. Its evolution stems 
from the change in methods of warfare and means of supporting them, together with 
the transformation of an operational and strategic planning and a tactical training. On 
the other hand, the strategy as a certain concept requires the effort to obtain, maintain 
and improve suitable hardware and modes of operation – thus we have an exemplary 
feedback loop between the technology and the strategy.
In short, the A2/AD concept combines two intertwined activities. First is working to 
not to allow enemy’s forces to enter a certain operational theater or otherwise designated 
area – this is the anti-access. Second is to deprive an enemy a freedom of operation inside 
the space of own domination in case an opponent manage to enter it – this is the area 
denial. It is worth to observe at this point, that nowadays we have only a new name for 
the centuries old military concept that has been present in the military thinking all the 
time and manifested itself in various forms of offensive defense strategies. For example, 
the NATO’s strategy in case of war with the Warsaw Pact encompassed actions to inter-
dict the second wave of the Red Army in Central Europe, thus prohibiting its entrance 
into the western European theater. 
As we are going to describe the current Chinese A2/AD strategy, which is oriented 
against the United States, it is necessary to explain the American military strategy that 
is supposed to be foiled by China. It is for to depict the context in which further conside-
rations are more comprehensive and clear. Of course the general U.S. military strategy 
is well known and is widely analyzed and commented, but it should be mentioned here 
anyway though in short and without references redundant in this case.
Since the end of the World War II the United States implemented the strategy of 
global engagement, which deemed exercising the political influence in every single re-
gion of the world necessary. During the cold war there were two distinct, but closely en-
tangled motivations behind this approach. Firstly, it was the need to contain the Soviet 
Union which was aggressive and expansive by its nature – the political influence was to 
muster and support the opposition against it. Secondly, the expanding American eco-
nomy required foreign markets and resources – the political influence was to ensure its 
global reach. The connection between those two motivations was very important. The 
Soviet Union was not only the ideological and military menace for the U.S., threatening, 
vaguely to be true, the very existence of the country. Its expansion would also have limi-
ted or even diminished a sphere of the American economic penetration. Thus the politi-
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cal influence worldwide was functional to the global expansion of the U.S. economy, be-
cause it was dangerously contested by the Soviet ideology and the political attractiveness 
embedded in it. Not much changed with the end of the cold war, the American political 
influence throughout the world is still chiefly economically motivated.  
To maintain the political influence, what mean to keep friends, partners and allies 
connected and susceptible to the U.S. interest, Washington uses various methods from 
political and economic arsenals; not to mention the soft power of a cultural attractive-
ness which is an instrument of influence even if it is not manageable directly the way 
the others are. The next effective and important tool of sustaining the political control is 
the American military might. On the one hand it guarantees the security to those who 
co-operate and on the other it is ready to subdue unfriendly competitors. This of course 
requires the armed forces to be able to physically support political commitments via the 
deterrence as a rule or the coercion if needed. It also means that should such necessity 
arise, they must be ready to perform combat missions during conflicts of various inten-
sity. To fulfill this political task the U.S. military must be credible, that is it should be 
obvious to everyone that it is capable to successfully execute tasks relied upon it in every 
possible circumstances. In the practical terms it implies that the armed forces must ma-
intain clear superiority over every possible enemy. But this superiority does not mean 
neither the numerical one, because it would be too much a burden for the economy, 
nor the absolute argument the nuclear forces are, for it cannot be a tool of the everyday 
policy. 
More specifically, in order to credibly guard the U.S. influence, the military must be 
able to sustain effective operations in the long term and in distant regions, together with 
conducting extensive military campaigns there. This requires the global system of force 
projection, based on a constellation of the fixed military installations capable to support 
ground and air forces, and on the powerful navy capable to sustain independent multi-
-purpose sea-land-air operations. Which is more the American forces must be able to 
operate freely in every region where they are needed. Term “freely” means nothing less 
than the ability to move effectively against every local competitor while keeping own 
losses near zero. The latter is the key to the long-term success in two ways. Firstly, it is 
the widely acknowledged socio-political context – the democratic societies are overly 
averse to casualties and this may endanger the political legitimization of any military 
action and the expeditionary role of armed forces as a whole. Secondly, and even more 
importantly in practical terms, any loss of an equipment or an element of the infrastruc-
ture entail the cost of its supplementation; it is highly undesirable because another foun-
ding feature of the U.S. military posture is its sustained nature on global scale, while at 
the same time keeping the military budget down as possible to not to make it too much a 
burden for the state and the citizenry. This way, high and frequent combat losses are not 
only painful politically and not only lead to a loss of the international prestige, but also 
make all the philosophy of the foreign policy of the USA questionable. The historical 
examples of Korean and especially Vietnam wars are very telling with respect to that. 
The only one way to combine all this ambitious military tasks with the political and 
economic constrains is the superior technology. Only this may give desired advantages 
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over every opponent, providing crucial force multipliers that ensure the most wanted 
freedom of operation. And so, the nature of the military preponderance of the United 
States is chiefly technological. That is why the military domination over the better part 
of the world was achieved through quite modest, relative to the GDP, military budget. 
Only the Soviet Union managed to contest this superiority effectively, even though it 
was somewhat backward in terms of the military technology. It is worth to underline 
again the relative low cost of this policy as its crucial enabler. The expenses grew signi-
ficantly only in times of the bigger conflicts, like Korea or South Vietnam, which were 
also proxy wars for the main American adversaries, Soviet Union or China. 
Summarizing to this point, the United States has to date managed to successfully 
implement the military strategy that supported overall aims of the foreign policy and 
so ensured the economical impact of the United States. One of key elements of its ef-
fectiveness was the overwhelming superiority over every local competitor, through the 
technological supremacy. 
But today this comfortable situation changes significantly. Mostly because the tech-
nologies emerge and proliferate that may disrupt the American superiority and thus 
nullify or at least complicate the main local strategies of the United States. As some 
informed observers notice, “[f]or over 70 years, the U.S. approach to projecting power 
has centered on build ing up ground and air forces at forward bases and positioning its 
fleet close to the enemy’s shores. But with ever-greater numbers of missiles and aircraft 
armed with precision-guided munitions, China and other rivals are increasingly able 
to target U.S. forces at greater distances.” (Thornbery, Krepinevich, p. 27)
The problem here is not only an overall advancement of the military technology, 
which is being developed throughout the world. It is especially important that we wit-
ness the rapid spread of some specific applications that may endanger crucial elements 
of the American power projection system, thus putting the whole U.S. global strategy in 
jeopardy. And to do this it is not necessary to develop the better air force or the better 
navy to prevail in the decisive battle. Some other, much more modest in terms of size 
and cost, means of warfare may be applied within asymmetric strategies aimed at the 
forward based or deployed supporting infrastructure of the armed forces. This way, wi-
thout an all-out confrontation, the U.S. military could lose the ability to fulfill its tasks 
on the given theater. 
An essence of this asymmetry here is as follows. To achieve their goals of deterren-
ce or coercion, the Americans must maintain the firepower and the freedom to use it 
without substantial losses, through a complex system of supporting efforts and infra-
structure. The local competitor on the other hand, may only hit the elements of support 
to eliminate the U.S. combat forces, if only the weapons available allow. And today the 
technologies materialize with the potential to do just that and the concepts to use them 
against the U.S. are being crafted. The A2/AD strategy is the realization of this asymme-
tric philosophy to push the United States out of certain regions without confronting the 
American forces in a conventional battle. The ultimate aim is to diminish and finally 
nullify the American political influence in the given region; furthermore it should lead 
to a deterioration of the U.S. economic power.
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All the above applies to an extent to the situation in the Western Pacific theatre, 
where the American military influence is being increasingly questioned by the Chinese 
anti access capabilities that are combined with the cohesive strategic concept. The most 
general logic of this strategy is as follows.
In the peacetime A2/AD assets are supposed to be a tool of control of the strategical-
ly important swaths of sea and an instrument of the deterrence, effective even against 
overly superior, in general military terms, opponent, that the United States is and will 
remain for the time being. The anti access strategy is then to create a sort of the buffer 
zone, adding uncertainty to the US contingency planning. It is the policy of rising stakes 
in case of the conflict, that should mitigate the U.S. in its actions to keep the contested 
areas open. To be exact, in the peacetime the freedom of navigation will of course be 
maintained formally, but the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force will always be “under the 
gun” while entering certain areas – it means the situation when the naval or air assets 
may be instantly attacked and inflicted heavy damage, unacceptable from a point of 
view of the logic of the naturally overstretched U.S. worldwide military presence. 
In times of a possible future crisis, for example the invasion of Taiwan, Chinese anti 
access forces would be able to deny the United States the ability to intervene freely, that 
means, again, with little or no losses. Washington is supposed to be assured that any 
involvement in the intra-Chinese conflict will be prohibitedly costly. And so it would be, 
for example in a case of sinking of any of the U.S. fleet carriers, for they are not only the 
symbol of the American power that would wane. The extreme cost1 and low production 
rate2 makes every vessel indispensable as there are just 11 ships of that class, of which 
usually at least two undergo overhaul, maintenance or training. 
In a case of the all-out war, the A2/AD capabilities are supposed to prevent Chinese 
mainland from being attacked by the American conventional forces. Thus, the main 
goal of the American strategy which traditionally is to degrade an enemy’s economy 
and infrastructure to force it to surrender, would not be possible to achieve without 
crossing the nuclear threshold. This should allow China to not to lose the conventional 
war against the U.S. and to be able to execute the most of what Beijing wanted within the 
contested theatre. This would be in fact the defeat of the United States. 
If all the above mentioned elements of the Chinese anti access strategy are effecti-
vely implemented, it would lead to a significant deterioration of the American political 
influence throughout the region, even in the peacetime. Having its armed forces, the 
guarantor of allies’ security, effectively pushed out of the region, the U.S. would gradu-
ally lose its relevance. The partners like Japan, South Korea or Taiwan would have to 
redefine their own priorities and policies to adapt to the situation of diminished role of 
the United States. In turn, without those allies the American engagement in the Western 
Pacific would be impossible. 
1 The newest fleet carrier Gerald R. Ford, commissioned into service 22 July 2017, cost almost 13 billion 
USD (in 2008 dollars) (O’Rourke, 2017,1, p. unnumbered (Summary)).
2 The next carrier to be launched, John F. Kennedy is supposed to enter service in 2024 (O’Rourke, 
2017,1, p. 6).
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All the consequences described above may indeed come true, because, as we already 
noticed, the U.S. is in the offensive position in the distant theatre, overstretched and 
with the rear areas vulnerable to attacks – though until now the technological domina-
tion was decisive enough to maintain such U.S. posture. But evolving A2/AD capabilities 
may give a defensive side, the Chinese in our instance, very powerful instruments that 
would augment the natural advantage that every defending side enjoys. It could then 
create the potential to strike the American force projection infrastructure and the exten-
sive ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capabilities that are an indispensable 
part of the U.S. technological edge. Thus, to foil the American strategy and in effect to 
push the United States out of the Western Pacific, Chinese forces could target first of all 
the supporting elements, like: 
 – the ISR system, that might be degraded by elimination or limitation of the effecti-
veness of the main means of optic, radiolocation and electromagnetic reconnais-
sance – satellite systems, airborne radar stations or stationary and airborne radio-
frequency monitoring stations, 
 – the logistic chain, that may be broken or at least weakened through attacks against 
the main bases that are staging areas for the operations in the region, including 
the deployable bases that the American carrier groups in fact are.
Until recently the actions of this sort against the U.S. armed forces could have been 
undertaken only by the Soviet Union or, to lesser extent, by Russia. Only this coun-
try could have denied the United States the freedom of operation within, and, to some 
distance, outside its borders, while also wielding the capabilities to strike deep inside 
the US held areas to hit supporting infrastructure. Today however, the technologies of 
that kind proliferate faster and faster throughout the world and the Chinese, together 
with, traditionally, Russians, became the leaders in this pursuit to deprive the U.S. its 
superiority. In general, the A2/AD arsenal comprises of precision strike munitions like 
air-launched long range stand-off weapons, ballistic missiles, land- and sea-launched 
cruise missiles and hyperspeed glide weapons, together with long range air defense we-
apons, attack submarines and anti-satellite assets. The Chinese armed forces possess or 
will soon possess all of the mentioned classes of weapons. 
The area of implementation of the Chinese A2/AD strategy is supposed to be mainly 
the South China Sea and the East China Sea with the adjacent approaches. According 
to Beijing’s expectations those regions should be the quarters controlled by the People’s 
Liberation Army, where the U.S. and allied forces could not operate freely. Here there 
is an element of the anti-access – a prevention of entrance of enemy’s combat forces by 
threatening to destroy or actual destroying the fixed staging infrastructure (bases) in 
the vicinity and the mobile ones (carriers (Sayler) and strategic bombers) upon entrances 
to the region. And an area denial is to prevent the forces that already entered the theater 
(land based or ship based air attack groups, attack submarines and other land attack 
assets) from operating freely – it means, let us reiterate, the ability to conduct missions 
against targets on the mainland or within the theater with acceptably low casualties. 
It is no wonder then, that the United States undertake the concentrated effort to fo-
restall adverse effects of the maturation of the A2/AD strategies. It of course refers most 
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of all to China, as this country is perceived by the Americans as the increasingly capable 
peer competitor in the near future. The systemic effort to deal with the situation is cal-
led Third Offset Strategy, and it is supposed to develop complex technologies leading to 
the deployment of new weapons systems that could keep Chinese A2/AD assets in check 
(Cronin, Rapp-Hooper, Krejsa, p. 12). The implementation of those new capabilities is 
supposed to be framed into the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global 
Commons (JAM-GC). It is a newly approved operational concept of the U.S. armed for-
ces that gives a lot of attention to a suppression of the A2/AD capabilities (Hutchens, 
Dries, Perdew, Bryant, Moores). But, as Biddle and Oerlich rightly notice, “[t]he A2/AD 
debate is mostly about the future, not the present. For now, there is little real A2/AD 
threat to confront: most analysts still see U.S. naval and air superiority over the Pacific 
except for the immediate Chinese littoral and sometimes the airspace over Taiwan.” 
(Bidle, Oerlich, p. 10-11)
It is a very good suggestion, because it points out to the most relevant finding, to 
be elaborated later on in this text, that the A2/AD strategy does not exist in an effective 
form yet. On the one hand it is being quickly developed by the Chinese, but on the other, 
it is being countered with great determination by the U.S. And thus the political con-
sequences, that we are going to finally talk about by the end of this paper, and that also 
refer to the future developments, fit into the mostly prognostic value of the discussion 
on the space security.
The Limitations of the Chinese A2/AD Strategy 
Regardless some sober assessments, it is often believed, that all the above mentioned 
strike capabilities that China has developed to date and is currently developing would 
soon allow Beijing to successfully establish the military domination over the South and 
East China Seas. And so, it looks apparent that the powerful weaponry from the A2/AD 
arsenal would eventually push the U.S. from the positions in Western Pacific – and the 
erosion of the political and then the economic influence of Washington would surely 
follow. 
But it is not going to be the case, at least not in a foreseeable future of the next decade 
or two. The argument behind this statement points to the critically important limita-
tions of the A2/AD strategy in general and of the Chinese concept specifically. Biddle 
and Oerlich indicate very precisely the two closely connected issues with regard to that 
(Biddle and Oerlich, pp. 22-23). First is the defensive nature of the Chinese anti access 
strategy that binds its implementation to the mainland, at least for the time being. Sec-
ond is the fact that it is, again by its nature, the weak against the strong situation, and it 
is going to remain so for now. Altogether it means that the A2/AD strategy might exploit 
some vulnerabilities of a mightier, offensive side by a weaker defense but it is strongly 
limited by the geography that overwhelmingly affects operational realities. It is obvious, 
that the further the Chinese want to extend an effective range of their weapons systems, 
the more complicated, more expensive, fewer in number and more difficult to operate 
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they become, and thus they require better and better technology. But even more import-
ant, while to less extent acknowledged, is that to support longer range strike assets it is 
necessary to possess more sophisticated ISR capabilities that are indispensable part of 
any military operation. 
Let us elaborate. The term ISR refers to the comprehensive process, executed by a 
very complex set of instruments and methods. It combines hardware, like the detection 
grid, monitoring assets, various transceiver stations with the software like analyzing al-
gorithms, data processing tools and C3 (communications-command-control) infrastruc-
ture. Its tasks are manifold, starting from general issues like getting basic information 
on potential targets, their properties, composition, and methods of their operational 
use, together with a doctrine and a level of training. More specifically it is a procedure 
of detection, identification and tracking of opposing forces and their elements, to fix the 
enemy’s position and to establish the parameters of its movement. Ideally, this process 
should be continuous, what effectively mean the ability to constantly observe adversary’s 
forces and to analyze their movement in the real time. It is worth to reiterate that the 
modern ISR3 system is a very complex set of interconnected tasks and actions that form 
the comprehensive tool. It also implies that the means that should be used for this task 
are also diverse and sophisticated in order to achieve the desired effect. The biggest 
challenge for the ISR is of course the distance, the further the target is from staging areas 
of the assets at the disposal, the more difficult the process is and the more sophisticated 
technology and expensive means it requires.
And so, when we analyze the Chinese A2/AD vs. the U.S. military in the Western 
Pacific theater, we must not only take into an account the Chinese offensive capabilities. 
First of all, we have to assess the ability of the Chinese ISR system to support offensive 
operations at desired ranges vs. modus operandi of the American forces and their func-
tion in the region, with the special attention to geographical constrains. 
The contested area, where the A2/AD strategy is to be performed includes South 
and East China seas. But to make it really effective the immediate approaches like Sea of 
Japan and Philippine Sea, together with the vast portions of Philippine and Indonesian 
archipelagos should also be controlled. It requires the ability to conduct effective strikes 
against key installations in Okinawa, central Japan and Guam, at a distances of 700, 
1500, 3000 km from the Chinese mainland, respectively. Not to mention the U.S. carrier 
battle groups and nuclear submarines heavily laden with cruise missiles scattered across 
huge ocean. 
In order to perform such a tremendous task the Chinese must wield vast ISR capabi-
lities that would allow detecting, tracking and targeting enemy forces at great distances 
in the real time. And here appear the fundamental limitations of the A2/AD concept, 
that render especially the A2 mission extremely difficult or maybe impossible. 
3 Often referred to as ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance), what is quite 
proper, but the use of the expanded term would not give us much more insight but would surely blur the 
argument.
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The main instruments of the long range sensing are obviously radar stations, supple-
mented by optical, infrared and passive means of reconnaissance. Optical and infrared 
sensors are obviously limited by the weather and distance. The passive detection de-
pends on the enemy’s emissions, usually it is also not so accurate to do more than target 
detection and preliminary acquisition, and they are also vulnerable to countermeasures. 
Thus, the radiolocation, as to the least extent depended on natural phenomena and the 
most flexible in terms of overcoming the countermeasures is the basis of the ISR. 
The radar sensors’ effectiveness is limited by many factors, starting from weather, 
artificial or natural jamming emissions to the most important and unbeatable fact that 
radio waves propagate only along the straight lines. It seems obvious but is frequently 
omitted that a radar station must have the line of sight to the object it tracks, unob-
structed neither by the high terrain nor by the curvature of Earth. The latter is the most 
important for the maritime operations, but ships may also “hide” behind the landmasses 
of the islands. Of course there are over-the-horizon radar stations, they are also being 
built in China, but their usefulness for the A2/AD strategy is limited, due to the lack of 
precision and low resolution – they can only be used for the preliminary detection. All in 
all, it is the system of radar stations that form the backbone of the Chinese ISR available 
for the A2/AD mission. They are located on the fixed positions on the ground, on the 
air-borne platforms and on the ships at sea, with the addition of the recently constructed 
stations on the reefs and shoals of the South China Sea. 
The next complication for the Chinese long range ISR is obviously the American still 
superior military power that also includes highly effective weapons designed to fight 
radar stations. The U.S. Forces also have an extensive expertise on the issue, because 
blinding the enemy by suppressing its detection system was always the core of U.S. of-
fensive strategy. That is why we have to take for granted that in a case of the conflict 
the U.S. forces will be first of all targeting the Chinese ISR system. This will make its 
operation very difficult and will impose cautious, defensive use of available assets. In 
practical terms it means that the Chinese will have to keep their the most valuable, the 
most effective radar stations, especially air-borne ones, quite deep behind the defensive 
perimeter of own air defense. The latter comprises first of all of a large number of relati-
vely modern ground based missile batteries and strong fighter force that operates from 
airfields on the Chinese mainland and on Hainan island, supplemented with ships with 
surface-to-air missiles at forward positions. As we can see, the air defense perimeter is 
strongly bound to the positions on land, and this fact is of the most profound consequ-
ences. According to Biddle and Oerlich the effective range of Chinese radar detection 
with such constraints is about 400-600 km seaward (Biddle and Oerlich, pp. 26-29). This 
covers only the immediate vicinity of the Chinese mainland without Okinawa or Japan. 
Any try to enlarge this range means moving air-borne assets with naval support towards 
the outskirts or even outside the main land-based defense perimeter. It would mean im-
mediate powerful and probably overwhelming response from the U.S. naval and ground 
based forces – this will be discussed in more detail later on. 
Summarizing to this point, currently fielded ISR assets allow China to use A2/AD 
strike capabilities against moving targets only at a relatively close range. This would 
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surely make the U.S. forces difficult and costly to take the positions against the Chinese 
mainland. But on the other hand the US carrier battle groups should be relatively safe 
even when inside the range of the DF-21D carrier-killer missiles, provided they keep the 
abovementioned distance. Of the fixed infrastructure, the US bases in Okinawa could 
probably be destroyed by the barrage of a great number of short range missiles that wo-
uld saturate the defenses and cover all the area with blind salvos. But the bases in Japan 
are larger and the dispersion of assets could be more effective, they are also defended by 
strong sea and land based missile defense – there are also much fewer medium range 
rockets that could strike those targets. In effect, blind missile bombardment would be 
much less effective there, probably leaving those bases operational. Guam should survi-
ve limited attack as well.
It is of course conceivable, that the Chinese would venture some actions in order 
to enlarge the sphere covered by own ISR. This would mean great operations involving 
number of naval and air force assets that would escort the air-borne surveillance plat-
forms and form the mobile perimeter against the American firepower. Such a force co-
uld try to enter open waters of South China or East China seas. But it would in fact mean 
the resignation from the asymmetry that is between the U.S. Navy and the Air Force 
and Chinese land based assets. Eventually, such a foray would end up in head-on fight 
against the superior U.S. armada. This decision, to go to such a battle would at the same 
time mean the resignation from the A2/AD defensive posture. It would also require a 
number and quality of combat assets that is unreachable by China in foreseeable future, 
unless Beijing decides on substantial increase in the military spending in relation to 
GDP. But this would in turn put the Chinese economical miracle at risk without any 
guarantee of yielding expected results.
One might think that the radar stations on the rocks and shoals of the South China 
Sea would be the solution. It is so in the peacetime and maybe during low intensity cri-
ses. But in a case of the deep crisis or especially the all-out war those positions will be 
overwhelmed by the U.S. forces within the hours. They simply do not have the potential 
to host substantial defense for their own and being far away from the mainland they 
cannot be properly protected by the land based forces. 
Of course the PLA’s navy is developing fast (O’Rourke, 2017,1) and, as some say, it 
could become the real blue water power within next two decades (Cronin, Rapp-Hooper, 
Krejsa, Sullivan, Doshi ), provided huge sums of money are secured. And then it would 
be able to move the range of the Chinese ISR somehow, but it is not going to be the 
substantial change of situation4. Mainly because that in any case the Chinese navy will 
remain much weaker than the U.S. and allied naval forces – especially the Japanese, that 
is growing in strength as the country gradually takes more and more assertive military 
posture.
4 To be honest we must note that some scenarios that predict the other outcome exist, but they have 
rather narrow chances of being fulfilled, so they are not mentioned here in order to not to blur the main 
argument.
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“Inside its near seas, China’s navy could become just as vulnerable as the United 
States’ to anti-ship missile barrages, and beyond the first island chain Beijing’s blue-wa-
ter force would be without its missile force multiplier and guided by a much less robust 
surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike network than when closer to home.” (Cronin, 
Rapp-Hooper, Krejsa, Sullivan, Doshi, p. 28).
Summarizing all the current developments related to the Chinese A2/AD strategy 
we must observe, that China does possess precision strike capabilities that could be used 
against the U.S. bases or forces as they deploy into the theater of South and East China 
seas. However conventional land, air and sea based ISR capabilities do not allow to use 
this assets to their full effectiveness. Currently a distance on which the A2/AD strategy 
may be executed is roughly 400-600 km from the Chinese shores. In the future, the Chi-
nese navy and long range aviation would probably develop fast and this could change the 
situation to an extent, but not much, for “[…] the effectiveness of China’s increasingly 
blue-water force will depend on a network of enabling and force-multiplying systems. 
Fundamentally, these revolve around the collection and exploitation of information – 
a surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike network able to pair robust data with precise 
kinetic capabilities. […] “[A]s Beijing’s naval ambitions take it [Chinese navy] beyond 
the First Island Chain – and the sensors and missiles buttressing its strength therein – it 
will face the same weaknesses of the American network but with added geographic con-
straints.” (Cronin, Rapp-Hooper, Krejsa, Sullivan, Doshi, p. 26)
The one most effective way to improve the long range ISR capabilities, and this 
brings us very close to the main point of this paper, is to place the surveillance assets in 
the orbits in space. The nature of the observation systems circling the world makes them 
be the ultimate high ground from where everything on Earth may be seen. The properly 
set up constellation of satellites may provide a constant control over certain regions, or 
even globally, with the use of optical, infrared and radar sensors and stations monitoring 
the electromagnetic spectrum. Such a solution may give the Chinese a perfect live-action 
view on the whole American activity, provided the satellites are modern enough to be 
able to transmit broadband data with appropriate protection from countermeasures. If 
China achieves this ability it will instantly drop off all the limitations of current A2/AD 
strategy and will be able to exploit its strike capabilities to the full extent. The United 
States on the other hand will the same moment lose one of its core advantages which is 
the superiority of the American worldwide ISR system, based to a great extent on the 
satellite detection and imaging. And this is exactly the way the Chinese follow with their 
space activities, currently working to establish its own space-borne, comprehensive ISR 
system.
Indeed, the Chinese treat space capabilities as crucially important support measure 
and they also integrate it with the other means of information support for the armed 
forces. It is also reflected with the recent creation of the new command structure, the 
PLA’s Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). 
“This new service (junzhong) brings together Chinese military space, electronic 
warfare, and network warfare capabilities and reflects the military’s holistic view of spa-
ce. For the Chinese military, establishing space dominance is integral to the larger effort 
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to establish information superiority. Consequently, the PLaSSF is expected to coordina-
te space, electronic warfare, and cyber operations.” (Cheng)
And so, if, or rather when, China manages to create the indigenous strategic, satellite 
based ISR system, the A2/AD strategy encompassing designated areas will be complete 
and will go into effect. However, it will also become dependent on the new batch of hard-
ware and that will pose another important limitation – the satellite systems are highly 
vulnerable to the opponent’s counteraction exactly because of the same characteristics 
of the orbital mechanics that make satellites be so perfect tool of the ISR. As they can see 
everything on Earth, they can also be seen and easily targeted by earth based or orbital 
weapons. Although there is no “official” ASAT5 weapon in the American arsenal, as 
early as in 2008 the United States shot down its own malfunctioning satellite with the 
SM-3 anti-ballistic missile. Currently there are as many 33 U.S. Navy ships equipped 
with this system with hundreds of rockets on board, not to mention the capabilities for 
laser blinding of optical and infrared sensors or electromagnetic jamming of radar sys-
tems. So, in a case of the conflict or crisis, the Chinese observation, communication and 
positioning systems would surely be the first prey of the U.S. forces. 
It might therefore look like there is nothing substantially changed, even with the 
advent of the Chinese satellite ISR systems. They are of course very useful, but in a case 
when they are the most badly needed it seems they would not be able to operate, so the 
whole A2/AD system would again be foiled. But it is not the case, just because by lifting 
the ISR abilities into space China is creating the new symmetry with the U.S. in military 
capabilities – the second one after the ability to conduct strategic thermonuclear strike 
against each other. It is because China is also capable to conduct extensive anti-satellite 
operations by cyber hacking, blinding and jamming; the Chinese forces also possess ef-
fective anti-satellite weapons. This way, in a case of the hostilities the U.S. will be equally 
vulnerable to the Chinese actions as they are to the American. So there emerges a kind 
of the balance of power in space that does not exist on the ground and that transcends 
beyond the A2/AD strategy. Incoming mutual vulnerability in this highly important 
and sensitive domain will bring significant political consequences. And they are going 
to be to a great extent the outcome of the evolution of the A2/AD strategy striving to go 
beyond its natural limitations. 
The Political Implications for the Space Security
Before getting into the main theme of this article, it is worth to address some general 
issues that concern the term “space security”. There is a lot of uncertainty with regard 
to this, the theoretical debate pertaining the principal issues involved has not yielded 
satisfactory results yet (Lutesand, Hays, Manzo, Yambrick, Bunn). In the theoretical di-
scussion it is especially debatable how the term “space security” and its content is related 
or depended or even ancillary to the national security or the international security. All 
5 Commonly used abbreviation of the term “anti-satellite”.
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in all the outer space, as it is usually defined, is the domain of “terran” subjects – states 
or private entities that reside on Earth. 
And so, it may be argued that the space beyond our planet is just an extension of 
the sphere of states’ activity and their regulation authority, roughly the way the airspace 
is. Note, that the airspace, as a domain of the human activity, had been largely defined 
in terms of its relevance by a host of theoreticians in the thirties, forties and fifties of 
the XXth century. Its utilization had been quite precisely delineated by the nation sta-
tes within the international law, following a centuries long process of the regulation of 
the law of the sea. Here we also have the notion of the “spacepower”, coined along the 
analogy with the “seapower” and the “airpower” – usually it is understood as the means 
and methods, together with related structures that the state assemble to benefit from the 
space activities. This point of view is maintained by many theoreticians, mostly of the 
conservative orientation, who stress the role of space specifically as a state’s tool. 
On the other hand it should be noted, that laws of the orbital mechanics and cha-
racteristics of space as a very hostile environment make this domain entirely different 
from a point of view of the modes of its use and the opportunities that it presents. The 
most important distinction lays in the properties of motion of objects in various envi-
ronments. The physical characteristics of the atmosphere and the seas allow man-made 
objects to maneuver freely (with certain limitations of course) – and so they are able to 
avoid trespassing restricted areas, sovereign territories for example. The space-borne ob-
jects, however, are kept on their trajectories by centrifugal and gravitational forces and 
so their paths are always the closed curves within the plane that crosses Earth’s center 
- therefore they almost always orbit over many countries. A general misunderstanding 
of the properties of satellite systems is clearly visible in a common reference to their 
movements as a “flight”. But satellites do not “fly”, because this term implies the move-
ment that is or at least may be constantly steerable. So again, satellites do not “fly”, they 
“orbit”, and that is the entirely different situation. The other very important limitations 
to the human space activities are: a very steep price for lifting any payload to the orbit, 
and extremely hostile environment that is destructive to both life and the equipment. 
Those constrains are so important, that all the theoreticians, even those who have the 
most “statecentric”, unilateral view of space and so of its security, admit it first place and 
without hesitation (Oberg, pp. 67-85). It is therefore arguable, that the attitude opposite 
to a casual realist one is more functional to the understanding and defining the issue of 
the space security. And so, one can say, that the perspective of the international security, 
understood as the realm of interconnected actions, relations and attitudes together with 
the structure that they spawn, may give a much better insight into the nature of the spa-
ce security, as the domain to an extent detached from states and not entirely defined by 
their will. This line of argument may lead to the conclusion that because of the features 
of the outer space which make it be the ultimate global common, naturally prone to the 
co-operation, the defining of the space security should be conducted within the logic of 
the international relations rather than from “nationcentric” perspective of the national 
security studies.
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Summarizing this short theoretical reflection we should define the space security 
for the purpose of this article. So, let us recognize that when using the term “space secu-
rity” we refer to the state (level, amount, degree, intensity, etc.) of the threats to the or-
bital infrastructure, which we understand as a part of the broader space infrastructure, 
both civil and military. The space security refers to both natural and man-made threats, 
which we define as activities or phenomena that could adversely affect orbital infra-
structure. As we can see, it is rather broad understanding, where the perspective of state 
and its interests and the perspective of the space as a global common may be combined. 
The problem of the space security, as defined above has its inherent legal dimension, 
too. And it is very important aspect, even if the space law, that means a branch of the 
international law that refers to the activities in the outer space, is not well developed. 
Within the area that we are discussing, where the international law is the organizer of 
the security system, the space law is more than sketchy and in fact confines only three 
principal provisions: 
 – the ban on the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space and on cele-
stial bodies,
 – the ban on the establishment of military installations or fortifications and on con-
ducting military maneuvers on celestial bodies, and 
 – the general stipulation that the outer space is the heritage of the Mankind and 
therefore should be used peacefully to benefit all the humanity.
The other important dimension of the space security is its military relevance. Since 
the beginning of the space age satellite systems have been used for the purposes related 
to the state security, but only to support warfighting capabilities, never as a weapon. 
But the space weaponry is feasible, either to fight in space or between space and Earth, 
and let us take it for granted at this point, without dwelling into the technicalities in-
volved6. However, the space based weapons systems have not been constructed until to-
day because of questionable usefulness stemming mainly from the fact that orbital assets 
are naturally vulnerable to attack by the ASAT systems. Which is more, many kinds of 
combat missions that could be attributed to space based weapons may be executed well 
enough by much cheaper and more reliable ground-based ones. This is rather difficult 
to change with today’s and perspective technology, but this sober assessment does not 
mean that the space weapons will not be constructed – it is because the logic of the arms 
race is not entirely logical. 
The abovementioned issue leads to the economic dimension of the space security. 
Satellite systems are usually very expensive and although the costs are being constantly 
lowered by the miniaturization and overall development of the technology they are, and 
will remain high. Currently used military applications are especially expensive, any spa-
ce weapons system would cost much more, probably prohibitedly more, especially in the 
light of their questionable effectiveness and reliability. This is mainly because any space 
based weapon, especially the one that is supposed to strike the ground targets on a short 
6 For detailed reference on this issues see for example comprehensive report (Wright, Grego, Gron-
lund).  
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notice must consist of vast constellations of the highly sophisticated, read expensive, 
vehicles (Wright, Grego, Gronlund, pp. 89-104).
And finally, what interests us the most, it is the political dimension of the space 
security that binds together capabilities and costs with the policies of the states. This 
brings us back to important problems of the national security of a number of the most 
important countries, that strongly affect the state of the space security. Here we can find 
the explanation what is that determines the space security in the most profound way. It 
is of course about the space weapons, but rather about actual lack of them, and here we 
will see in full the impact of the development of the Chinese space capabilities.
As it was mentioned above, the military use of space is still limited to supporting 
of tasks concerning the national security, both in the peacetime, in crises or during the 
open war. It is worth to stress, that despite the technical capabilities they possessed, no 
superpower decided to weaponize space by designing effective weapons systems and 
fielding them in military relevant quantities. Since the dawn of the space era both global 
competitors mulled various projects of space based and anti-satellite weapons (Ziarnick, 
Garretson) (Zak), but they did not decide to turn any of them into a follow on in shape 
of the full scale weaponry. There was a number of economical and operational reasons, 
that taken together with the deterrent effect of the strategic nuclear forces made space 
weapons impracticable, as it was already mentioned above. But which is more, it was qu-
ite obvious that once the space based weapons had been fielded they would surely have 
been followed by the rapid expansion of the ASAT systems. This in turn would have me-
ant that all the support derived from satellites was questionable, and so, since both sides 
were highly satisfied with the peacetime usefulness of the space-borne capabilities, they 
were not willing to risk them in times of crises. And thus, the space based weapons were 
in fact unwanted, because their deployment would have surely endangered non-combat 
support systems, becoming more and more critical for every aspect of the operating of 
the military. This was especially important for the U.S., because the Americans were 
always more advanced in space so they benefited very much from using the orbital sys-
tems. It especially referred to the strategic intelligence that managed to lift, at least to 
some extent, the curtain behind soviet nuclear and delivery capabilities, and thus con-
tributed to maintaining the stability. Furthermore, while anti-satellite attacks posed no 
risk of direct human causalities, the space assets would have became tempting target in 
a case of the crisis at this could have lead to the politico-military escalation. This could 
have eventually resulted in an unwanted destruction of all the space-based capabilities 
of all the sides by triggering the “chain reaction” degradation of the space environment 
known as the Kessler effect (Kessler, Johnson, Liou, Matney). Should it happened it wo-
uld have been fatal to any human activity in space.  All this is why the weapons basing 
in space or the weapons designed to destroy space vehicles never came true during the 
cold war. 
The political tacit consensus on non-weaponization of the outer space, which until 
now has shaped the space security, came under a sort of strain in the XXIst century, 
when China entered the space race as the full scale competitor. We have already men-
tioned couple of times that Beijing is very much dedicated to the development of the 
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attributes of the spacepower, especially in the security arena. The Chinese planners un-
derstand that without space-borne support the PLA cannot gain a worldwide relevance, 
and it must follow the U.S. in the development of the satellite systems (Kulacki, 2014, 
p. 4). Furthermore, the Chinese civilian scientific and commercial programs boost the 
country’s prestige and are important as a demonstration the power of the Middle King-
dom, and support its successful strive to become the real global player. 
The situation within the realm of the space security changed then, first of all be-
cause the new contender entered the stage where traditional players had already been 
very well accommodated. Its first aim is now to show its ability and prove that it is more 
or less equal, and that the new, triangle-shaped relations are the reality. This is what is 
happening now, China proves beyond the doubt that it is the real spacepower, on a verge 
of perfecting all the military and civilian capabilities in space. And this complicates 
usually simple relations of the bipolar system, because the relations within the triangle 
are far more complex. 
But on the other hand the emerging situation has a lot in common with the tradi-
tional space security relations that were shaped by the USSR and USA. And this is very 
important, key assessment: China becomes more and more depended on the satellite 
systems, soon they will be indispensable for the role Beijing wants to perform in the 
world – as the example of the A2/AD strategy, extensively depicted in this paper shows. 
And note, that this strategy is just the first step for the Chinese military to counter the 
U.S. and to show its global ability. All this implies that satellite systems will be more and 
more needed and will become essential, both for military purpose and for the execution 
of the economic agenda – and not to mention, again, the prestige. Some experts even 
suggest that „[…] China’s military dependence on satellites may be greater than that of 
the United States” (Kulacki, 2016,1). And so, however the triangle is the new shape of the 
base for the space security, tricky and much more difficult to manage, the main stra-
tegic goals of all three participants are the same. Their best interest is to maintain safe 
and secure access to space in order to benefit from it. And because of the well-known 
constrains – all their systems are, and will remain vulnerable – the best logical solution 
is to maintain the weapons-free space security system. Any disturbance in the balance 
may lead to the very costly and risky arms race with all its security dilemmas (or even 
trilemmas) and other treacherous hazards. 
There is of course the question of the resilience of this triangular system, will it hold 
the reasonable balance despite a number of the adverse factors which are both embedded 
in its form, and depend on the internal drivers of state’s behavior. We may easily list a 
number of such distractive dynamics which may lead to the rapid weaponziation of the 
outer space, despite all the rationales depicted above.
Firstly, it is the natural feature of the trilateral system, in which each part must watch 
and offset actions of the two others, and the interactions among them, as well. It means 
far greater uncertainty than in bilateral system, because simple action-reaction situation 
is replaced by much more complex sequence. For example: action–reacktion1- reack-
tion2–secondary 1 vs 2 interaction. Thus, the situation is exponentially more volatile 
and much more difficult to stabilize. 
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Secondly, with a close relation to the above, any agreement regarding military bal-
ance is much more difficult in the situation when the parties to it must take into account 
the third party’s power, what Kenneth Waltz observed years ago (Waltz, p. 177). So the 
classic means of bilateral strategic relations would be inefficient with regard to seeking 
the reassurances and hammering the deal, even if it is only the tacit one. And the poten-
tially suitable means of the multilateral diplomacy, open or informal, may be considered 
very inconvenient by some of the parties.
And thirdly, any country may act as a spoiler, even if would mean surrendering the 
benefit of the non-weaponized space security system. It may happen because of many 
reasons. For example, one top of the triangle may decide to scrap its own advantages in 
order to deny it to the others, especially while feeling inferior somehow – it could very 
well be Russia. The other may embark on the risky road of flexing muscles and stirring 
adversities out of the internal reasons – China for example. And there is always the prob-
lem, solely applying to the USA, of the declining power syndrome – the U.S. may not 
be ready to give up perceived superiority even if this reluctance would result in a risky 
change of the traditional balance.
Summarizing the argument on the possible political influence of the development of 
the space-based leg of the Chinese A2/AD strategy for the space security. The rapid de-
velopment of the space systems lifts China to the position of the third space superpower 
(maybe Russia is still relatively weak element in that system, especially in the compari-
son to the U.S., but its space industry has its potential and is surely ready to join the new 
technological space race (Маурин ). The nature of the space-borne capabilities together 
with the usefulness of them creates the situation when all the parties are and will be, 
more or less equally, depended on their equally vulnerable systems. So the logic that has 
ruled the perception of the space security since the dawn of the Space Age to keep space 
weapons free is still valid, and in the shortest form goes like this: the anti-satellite and 
other space weapons may surely be useful, or even indispensable during the war (but 
only for the short time, as space would degrade soon in the event of the orbital battle); 
however in the peacetime or in crises short of war it is be better to keep and use own 
capabilities continuously, even if the opponent would be able to do just the same. 
Summary
So, as of today we are at a sort of the inflection point from where the space security 
may evolve in two general directions: either the rule of non-weaponization will be ma-
intained in the newly established triangle, or there will be a space arms race with all its 
consequences. There are many different arguments favoring both outcomes, the most 
important of them were mentioned above, none of them fully convincing. But there are 
the others, making the situation even more complicated. 
For example, not only the three space superpowers possess the ability to affect sa-
tellites, even non-state actors can do this by the means of cyber-hacking, jamming or 
blinding. Which is more, in theory, many countries that develop space lift capability 
and missile technology may design simple ASAT systems. All this takes the problem of 
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the space security beyond a triangle of the China-US-Russia relations and bring on the 
issue of the n-th power as a spoiler. Will it be suppressed, coerced to comply, or will go 
wild triggering the widespread arms race? On the other hand, again, we have the utility 
of space, especially of the civilian space sector, vital for the telecommunications and 
other modern applications, that would be in grave jeopardy in case of the proliferation 
of space weapons. 
There is also unpredictable, in our increasingly unpredictable and chaotic world, 
what exactly would be the superpowers’ attitude toward their own interests. We have 
already described several hypothetic situations in which some of the powers would be 
ready to break the lasting consensus for not exactly rational, from a point of view of the 
space security, reasons. But are those really so hypothetical? If, as some predict, Xi-Jin-
ping of China really tries to break the rules and remain in power after his term expires 
(Kellog), he would badly need the strong legitimization for his authority. What is better 
for that purpose, that the external conflict and the highlighted threat of dear values 
with the increasingly assertive military posture as a result? Weaponizing space under 
the nationalist flag and against alleged or actual American thrust to do the same, would 
suit such a policy very well. 
But perhaps, as it was already noticed above, the gravedigger of the space sanctuary 
system would indeed be the United States; ironically, because the U. S. benefit the most 
of the system that it has created. Currently in America we can observe a strong reluc-
tance to accept China as equal partner, the stronger the more equal it actually becomes. 
Which is more, the Americans tend to treat space as their own domain, maybe the last 
one in which they possess so big advantage, and that aggravates the problem. There are 
even the influential calls to mobilize and move to create the U.S. hegemony in space 
(Dolman), by the military means of course. “Perhaps that is why some U.S. officials ar-
gue the United States should refuse to support international efforts to place limits on the 
use of anti-satellite weapons.” (Kulacki, 2016,2). 
On the other hand it is plausible, even if quite optimistic, that the superpowers will 
eventually reach some formal solution on the ban of the space weapons. If they manage 
to structure their relations properly to be able to come to sober conclusion on what is 
their best interest, it is possible within the decade or so. We might observe the forming 
condition for such process; the growing usefulness and simultaneously the pertaining 
vulnerability of space systems and the strengthening of the economic relevance of space. 
The indispensability of the orbital applications may therefore lead to the evolution of the 
means to protect them. 
If to draw the most possible direction of the evolution of the space security with 
regard to the space weapons we could say that retaining of the sanctuary, at least for the 
time being is somehow more possible than the opposite. We think that it is the most pro-
bable that the main actors will retain their ASAT capabilities, but they will keep them 
in the basement, without fielding military relevant systems. But with the lack of formal 
agreement this situation may erode, especially with the proliferation of the missile de-
fense, which, it may be argued, possess inherent anti-satellite capabilities. Such creeping 
weaponization may once explode in full scale, rendering the space be even less friendly 
domain that it naturally is.
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